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OFFSETTING JUSTICE: PROTECTING 
FEDERALLY-EXEMPT BENEFITS FROM 
GARNISHMENT AND BANK SET-OFFS 
Arianna Tunsky-Brashich*
Abstract: For the millions of Americans who rely on direct deposit for re-
ceipt of their monthly federal benefits, section 207 of the Social Security 
Act provides a necessary protection against creditors. This federal law 
protects federal benefits from garnishment, attachment and other legal 
processes, but the courts, federal agencies, consumer groups and other 
stakeholders are in disagreement over its scope. This Note serves as a 
comprehensive review of the exemption, discussing its policy and history 
as well as case law that highlights the difficulty of applying its provisions to 
modern day banking practices. This Note concludes by advocating legisla-
tive and administrative actions to protect recipients of federal benefits 
payments. 
Introduction 
 In September 2007, seventy-year old Waverly Taliaferro testified 
before the Senate Finance Committee about how he and his wife had 
their bank account frozen as a result of mounting credit-card debt.1 At 
the time that it was frozen, the account held forty-seven dollars remain-
ing from the social security payment that had been directly deposited 
the month before.2 Mr. Taliaferro only learned of the freeze when he 
went to the grocery store to do his shopping.3 On the day that his next 
monthly social security check should have been deposited, he was un-
able to access any of the funds in his bank account.4 Even with the help 
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2008–2009). 
1 Frozen Out: A Review of Bank Treatment of Social Security Benefits: Hearing Before the S. Finance 
Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of witness Waverly Taliaf-
erro), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/sitepages/hearing092007.htm. On June 
24, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Social Security held a follow-
up hearing with largely the same focus as Frozen Out. See Hearing on Protecting Social Security 
Beneficiaries from Predatory Lending and Other Harmful Financial Institution Practices: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Subcomm. on Social Security, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter Hearings II], available 
at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=638. 
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of a legal services attorney, it took twenty-three days for the bank to un-
freeze the account.5 During this period, Mr. Taliaferro and his wife 
were forced to sell keepsakes and survive on brown rice; he lost forty 
pounds and she lost three dress sizes.6 When the account was finally 
unfrozen, rather than give Mr. Taliaferro an apology, the bank charged 
him forty-five dollars for applying the freeze.7 Since this incident, Mr. 
Taliaferro has received his social security payment by check and has 
suffered a “loss of dignity” as he has been forced to use a neighborhood 
check cashing store.8 Although Mr. Taliaferro tried to open up a new 
account with a different bank, that account, too, was frozen just days 
after he opened it.9
 The Senate Finance Committee held the hearings—collectively 
entitled “Frozen Out” —to examine the policies and procedures that 
banks, like the ones used by Mr. Taliaferro, follow when they receive 
state court orders to freeze assets.10 Representatives of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the National 
Consumer Law Center (NCLS) were among the federal agencies and 
consumer groups that testified.11 Their statements addressed the grav-
ity and complexity of a problem that has been exacerbated in recent 
years as more and more individuals receiving federal benefits have 
them directly deposited in bank accounts.12 Under federal law, Social 
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. at 2. 
6 Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Taliaferro). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. The bank advertised it would not freeze accounts that contained only direct de-
posit social security payments, and gave him a $100 signing bonus for opening the ac-
count. Id. However, because the account still had $25.25 left over from the signing bo-
nus—and therefore did not contain solely direct deposit social security payments—the 
bank could legally freeze the account and all of Mr. Taliaferro’s funds. Id. at 3. 
10 See id. (all statements). Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, chastised the banks and the federal banking regulatory agencies in his opening 
statement for not honoring an ancient rule set forth in the Book of Leviticus; rather than 
treating beneficiaries fairly and according to the law, he accused banks of “keeping Social 
Security beneficiaries’ payments far longer than all night, far longer than until morning.” 
See id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus). He went on to express disappointment with 
the federal banking regulatory agencies and the draft comment they issued that refused to 
recognize that the federal law protecting social security benefits preempted state law. Id. at 
2. 
11 See Hearings, supra note 1 (all statements). 
12 See id. at 1–12 (statement of Sara A. Kelsey, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Deposit Ins. Co.), 1–9 
(statement of Margot Saunders, Counsel, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.), and 1–12 (statement 
of Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller & Chief Counsel, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency). 
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Security Benefits, Supplementary Security Income Benefits, Veterans’ 
Benefits, Federal Civil Service Retirement Benefits, and Federal Rail-
road Retirement Benefits are supposed to be protected from garnish-
ment and attachment that would freeze bank accounts.13 However, 
banks, federal agencies, consumer groups, and other stakeholders are 
in disagreement over the extent of relevant federal law, which agency 
should regulate, and whether the banks should take the initiative to 
make sure that the accounting systems and processes that they use for 
managing accounts with directly deposited social security benefits pro-
tect those exempt assets.14
 Creditors obtain garnishment and attachment orders in state court 
that direct banks to freeze accounts.15 Once the banks freeze the assets 
to prevent withdrawals, they will also freeze subsequent deposits, in-
cluding those originating from the U.S. Department of the Treasury.16 
Furthermore, banks will assess fees for overdrafts while accounts are 
frozen and for complying with state court orders against frozen ac-
counts and deduct them from the account.17 In order to unfreeze the 
account, beneficiaries must go to the courthouse with supporting social 
security and account documentation and fill out a form stating that the 
funds are exempt.18 If a creditor agrees to release the funds, it will send 
a notice to the bank of its decision.19 However, if it disagrees, and 
chooses not to release the funds, usually the debtor’s only recourse is to 
request a hearing.20 The majority of banks do not review the source of 
deposited funds in the account they have been ordered to freeze.21 
Even if it is marked as an account into which federal benefits are di-
rectly deposited or electronic transfers from the Treasury Department 
                                                                                                                      
13 See 5 U.S.C. § 8470(a) (2000) (Federal Employees’ Retirement System); 38 U.S.C. 
§ 5301(a)(1) (2000) (Veterans’ Benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000) (Federal Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(1) (2000) (Supplemental Social 
Security for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled); 45 U.S.C. § 231m (2000) (Retirement of Rail-
road Employees). 
14 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 1–12 (statement of Kelsey), 1–9 (statement of Saun-
ders) and 1–12 (statement of Williams). 
15 See id. at 2 (statement of Kelsey) and 2 (statement of Williams). 
16 See id. at 2, 6 (statement of Kelsey), 4 (statement of Saunders) and 2 (statement of 
Williams). 
17 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Consumer Banking and Payments Law 47 (Supp. 
2007). 
18 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Saunders). 
19 Id. 
20 See id. at 2 (statement of Kelsey) and 4 (statement of Saunders). 
21 See id. at 4 (statement of Saunders). 
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are readily apparent, banks more often than not choose to freeze the 
exempt assets.22
 State and federal case law do little to clarify how banks should 
handle such garnishment and attachment orders.23 Banks take a 
“damned if we do, damned if we don’t” attitude; if they don’t freeze the 
funds, they claim they will be liable under state law to the creditor, and 
if they do freeze the funds, they claim they can be threatened with suit 
by the account holder.24 Accordingly, many financial institutions 
choose to comply with state garnishment orders and, if it comes to it, 
let the courts determine entitlement to the funds that the beneficiaries 
claim are federally-exempt.25
 The testimony at the September 2007 hearings combined with a 
recent one billion dollar judgment against Bank of America highlight 
just how serious this problem is becoming, especially as baby boomers 
hit retirement age and more elderly individuals rely on federal benefits 
as their primary source of income.26 At stake are potentially billions of 
dollars over an issue that raises questions of federal preemption, con-
gressional intent, and conflicting business and consumer interests.27 
                                                                                                                      
22 See id. 
23 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Kelsey). 
24 See id. at 3–5; cf. id. at 6 (statement of Saunders) (arguing that in most states, banks 
are required to attach only non-exempt funds and that banks would not be exposed to 
liability if they refused to honor a freeze on exempt assets). 
25 See id. at 4–5 (statement of Kelsey). 
26 See Miller v. Bank of Am., No. CGC-99–301917, 2004 WL 3153009, at *32–35 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2004), rev’d, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 223 (Ct. App. 2006), cert. 
granted, 154 P.3d 997 (Cal. 2007); Hearings, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Saunders) (stat-
ing that bank freezing of exempt funds “has become one of the most alarming and fre-
quent reasons for emergency requests for assistance to legal services lawyers all over the 
nation”) and 4–6 (statement of Johnson M. Tyler, SSI Unit Dir., S. Brooklyn Legal Servs.). 
Mr. Tyler testified that he is seeing a dramatic increase in the number of federal benefici-
aries having their accounts frozen. Id. at 4–6 (statement of Tyler). According to Mr. Tyler, 
about 750,000 New Yorkers have no source of income other than their monthly social se-
curity or Supplementary Security Insurance checks. Id. at 4. 
27 See, e.g., Miller, 2004 WL 3153009, at *32–35; Hearings, supra note 1, at 9–11 (state-
ment of Kelsey) (suggesting that possible solutions include legislative action and the prom-
ulgation of regulations by the Social Security Administration), 12 (statement of Saunders) 
(arguing that federal banking agencies have the statutory authority and must regulate to 
protect affected consumers), and 1 (statement of Williams) (“[A] solution will require 
involvement by and actions by multiple agencies . . . . The issues presented include unclear 
and undefined provisions of Federal Law, state laws and judicial processes that may unin-
tentionally produce results conflicting with Federal public policy objectives, and question-
able practices by debt collectors. The issues presented also implicate important Federal 
policy objectives affecting how Federal benefits payments are made . . . .”); B of A Ordered to 
Pay Millions for Fees for Tapping Direct Deposit Accounts, BNA, Mar. 27, 2007 (noting that dam-
ages for the the plaintiff-class were estimated at over 1.3 billion dollars). 
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This Note will serve as a comprehensive review of the current, growing 
problem—focusing on the social security exemption—and will suggest 
concrete and realistic legislative and administrative changes. 
 Part I of this Note will review the policy and history behind the fed-
eral benefits exemption and the requirement that federal payments be 
electronically deposited. Part II will briefly discuss the involuntary pay-
ments that banks garnish or set-off from a patron’s bank account. Part 
III will look at conflicting case law through analysis of the divide be-
tween Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions. This section will also review 
the pending litigation and legal questions at issue in Miller v. Bank of 
America. Finally, Part IV will suggest legislative and administrative actions 
that must be taken to protect recipients of federal benefits payments. 
I. The Social Security Act Exemption 
 In 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act as a mechanism to 
protect Americans from the devastating consequences of unemploy-
ment and old-age.28 Prior to the passage of the Act, there were only 
piecemeal approaches to social insurance, such as almshouses and the 
post-Civil War pension system.29 However, these were entirely inade-
quate in the face of economic insecurity that ravaged the country in the 
wake of the Great Depression.30 Grim realities of the Depression shifted 
popular support and elite attitudes and forced an understanding that 
the consequences of economic insecurity necessitated comprehensive 
government action.31 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, addressing 
Congress in 1934, proclaimed that it was the federal government’s duty 
to provide assistance to the country’s neediest citizens.32 For President 
                                                                                                                      
28 See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
29 G. John Ikenberry & Theda Skocpol, Expanding Social Benefits: The Role of Social Secu-
rity, 102 Pol. Sci. Q. 389, 395 (1987); John R. Sutton, The Political Economy of Madness: The 
Expansion of the Asylum in Progressive America, 56 Am. Sociological Rev. 665, 666 (1991). 
Usually locally-funded and poorly-administered, almshouses provided shelter for the 
homeless old-aged, widows, and the sick and disabled. Sutton, supra. Almshouses were 
criticized as both not providing any deterrent to able-bodied residents and as being un-
sanitary and abusive towards residents. See id. at 666–67. 
30 See W. Andrew Achenbaum, Social Security: Visions and Revisions 16–18 (1986). 
As banks collapsed, families saw their savings wiped out. Id. at 17. Many companies were un-
able to provide their pension obligations; close to fifty plans covering over 100,000 employees 
were abandoned between 1929 and 1932. Id. Other companies seized money that was tied up 
in pension funds and applied it to other expenses. See id. 
31 See id. at 13. 
32 President Roosevelt, Message to Congress ( June 8, 1934), available at http://www. 
socialsecurity.gov/history/fdrstmts.html#message1. 
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Roosevelt, “the security of the home, the security of livelihood, and the 
security of social insurance . . . constitute a right which belongs to every 
individual and every family willing to work.”33 These sentiments were 
embodied in the Act which provided a comprehensive national re-
sponse to the plight of the elderly, disabled workers, retirees in need of 
medical care, and war survivors.34
A. Protecting Basic Subsistence Needs from Creditors 
 Social security eligibility provides a level of financial stability that is 
becoming more important as average national savings per person dwin-
dles and an economic recession, which began in 2007, forces families to 
use their retirement savings for basic necessities.35 There are three kinds 
of social security benefits: Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), So-
cial Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security In-
surance (SSI).36 OASI provides benefits to retired workers and their sur-
vivors, SSDI provides benefits for disabled individuals under the 
retirement age and is calculated based on the individual’s work history 
and payroll taxes, and SSI is a means-tested program that provides bene-
fits for those who are over the age of 65, blind, or disabled and fit a 
definition of having low-incomes and few assets.37
                                                                                                                      
 
33 Id. 
34 See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C). 
35 See Catherine Rampell, Layoffs Spread to More Sectors of the Economy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
27, 2009, at A1 (discussing how massive layoffs are forcing many to use their retirement 
savings prematurely); Mary Williams Walsh & Tara Siegel Bernard, In Need of Cash, More 
Companies Suspend 401(k) Match, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2008, at A1 (discussing how employ-
ers are suspending matching 401(k) contributions as revenues decline because of the re-
cession); Editorial, The Thrift Imperative, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2005, at A34 (discussing how, 
from 2002 through 2004, the national savings rate was lower than at any time since the 
Great Depression). The most popular private sector retirement plans are 401(k) retire-
ment plans that are tax-qualified deferred compensation plans. IRS, Tax Topics: 401(k) 
Plans, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc424.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). The economic 
recession that began in 2007 caused the value of many investments to drop and prompted 
many employers to suspend matching contributions; this highlights the unreliable nature 
of 401(k) plans. See Susan Cornwall, Interview: U.S. Lawmakers to Mull Reforms for Shrunken 
401(k)s, Reuters, Jan. 22, 2009; Burton Frierson, U.S. Economy Faces Heavy Blow from Stocks 
Funk, Reuters, Nov. 26, 2008; Walsh & Bernard, supra. 
36 See CRS Report to Congress, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI) 4 (2006); 
Social Security Administration, Benefits for People with Disabilities, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
disability (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
37 See Soc. Security Admin., Understanding the Benefits 4–6 (2009), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10024.pdf; Soc. Security Admin., Supplemental Security In-
come 5–6 (2007), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/11000.pdf. For individuals born after 
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 In Title II of the 1935 Act, Congress included a provision against 
assignment of federal old-age benefits that, at its core, has remained 
largely unchanged.38
The right of any person to any future payment under this title 
shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and 
none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under 
this title shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, gar-
nishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any 
bankruptcy or insolvency law.39
This section—which at the time was numbered section 208 but was 
later changed to section 207—is not treated in the voluminous legisla-
tive history of the 1935 Act.40
 In 1983, Congress amended the Social Security Act.41 Although 
most of the amendments were directed towards managing the financing 
problems faced by the Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Pro-
gram (OASDI), there were several minor technical provisions included 
in the amendments as well.42 One of these provisions added subsection 
(b) to section 207, making it clear that the protections of the assignment 
provision are not superseded by any other law, including bankruptcy 
law, unless that law explicitly references section 207.43 The legislative his-
                                                                                                                      
 
1959, the full retirement age is 67. Social Security Administration, Retirement Benefits by 
Year of Birth, http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/agereduction.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
However, individuals can apply for benefits as early as age 62, although these benefits are 
reduced a fraction of a percent for each month before full retirement age. Id. An individual’s 
work history and social security taxes are used to calculate eligibility for retirement benefits. 
See Soc. Security Admin., How You Earn Credits 1–5 (2008), available at http://www. 
ssa.gov/pubs/10072.pdf. Each quarter worked in a year is considered one credit, so long as 
you earn above the minimum amount for that year. See id. at 1, 3. The number of credits 
needed to retire depends on the person’s age. See id. at 3. For example, anyone born in 1929 
or later must have worked for a minimum of ten years (or forty credits). See id. at 3. 
38 Social Security Act of 1935, Pub L. No. 74-271, § 208, 49 Stat. 620, 625. 
39 Id. 
40 Ellender v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
41 Social Security Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 335, 97 Stat. 65, 130. 
42 H.R. Rep. No. 98-25, pt. 1, at 1–2 (1983); John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security 
Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 46 Soc. Security Bull. 3, 
3 (1983). In addition to a projected long-term deficit, it was estimated that $100–200 bil-
lion would be needed to restore fiscal viability to the program through the 1980s. The 
SSDI program is a subset of the OASDI program. CRS Report to Congress, supra note 
36, at 4. 
43 Social Security Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 335, 97 Stat. 65, 130. 
Section 208 of the 1935 Act had been renumbered section 207 by the time of the 1983 
Amendments. The addition reads: “[n]o other provision of law, enacted before, on, or 
after the date of the enactment of this section, may be construed to limit, supersede, or 
330 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:323 
tory of the Amendments suggests that this revision was made in reaction 
to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.44 According to a report of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
some bankruptcy courts were treating social security benefits as income 
in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases and were ordering the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) to send all or a portion of the debtor’s monthly 
benefit check to the bankruptcy trustee.45 The 1983 Amendment thus 
clarified that Congress considered assignment through bankruptcy pro-
ceedings to be unlawful.46
 The minimal legislative history of section 207 makes it difficult to 
discern its scope and purpose. However, given its inclusion in the 1935 
Act and the goals of the federal insurance program, courts have inter-
preted that the purpose of section 207 is to insure that beneficiaries are 
able to meet basic subsistence needs, despite debts that may be owed to 
creditors.47 In her testimony at the Senate Finance Committee hear-
ings, counsel for the NCLS, cited that the five principle justifications for 
general exemptions that are commonly put forth by the courts are: 
1) to provide the debtor with subsistence funds; 2) to protect the 
debtor’s dignity; 3) to provide the debtor with the possibility of a fresh 
start; 4) to protect the debtor’s family; and 5) and “to spread the 
debtor’s burden from society to his creditors.”48 Courts are sensitive to 
the remedial and humanitarian ends to which exemptions are directed 
and interpret them liberally across circuits.49 For example, in Depart-
                                                                                                                      
 
otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by ex-
press reference to this section.” Id. 
44 H.R. Rep. No. 98-25, pt. 1, at 82. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. This suggested provision in the House bill was not amended by the Senate and 
the conference agreement thus followed the House bill. H.R. Rep. No. 98–47, at 153 
(1983). 
47 See In re Neavear, 674 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1982); Dep’t of Health and Rehabili-
tative Servs., Fla. v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828, 831 (5th Cir. 1980). When interpreting statutory 
construction, courts look at the language of the statute, as well as congressional intent and 
legislative history. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265–67 (1981). 
48 Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Saunders) (citing In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 
78, 83 (8th Cir. 1989); N. Side Bank v. Gentile, 385 N.W.2d. 133, 138–39 (1986) (stating 
that the Wisconsin article on exemptions was “a humane provision intended to protect 
persons from sudden calamity, destitution and misery”); see Alan N. Resnich, Prudent Plan-
ning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property 
on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 Rutgers L. Rev. 615, 621 (1978); William T. Vukowich, Debtors 
Exemption Rights, 62 Geo. L.J. 779, 784–88 (1974). 
49 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Saunders); see, e.g., Brown & Bartlett v. 
United States, 330 F.2d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1964) (stating that the circuit favors an interpre-
tation of the Social Security Act that gives effect to its “beneficent” purposes); Schroeder v. 
Hobby, 222 F.2d 713, 715 (10th Cir. 1955) (“The Social Security Act is to be liberally con-
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ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Florida v. Davis, the court found 
that the purpose of section 207 was to protect federal beneficiaries 
from creditors.50 The court declared that the exemption “evinces a 
clear legislative purpose of precluding beneficiaries from diverting 
their social security payments away from the statute’s seminal goal of 
furnishing financial, medical, rehabilitative and other services to needy 
individuals.”51 Thus, when a levy or legal process results in the denial of 
basic resources, section 207 and its protections are properly invoked.52 
Furthermore, the courts have interpreted the exemption to apply not 
only to benefits that have been paid, but also to those that the benefici-
ary will be entitled to in the future.53 Ambiguities created by the Act, 
perhaps as a result of this liberal construction, are generally construed 
in the plaintiff’s favor when it is reasonable to do so.54
B. Favoring Electronic Payments 
 In 1996, Congress passed the Debt Collection Improvement Act 
(EFT 99), requiring that most federal government payments be elec-
tronically transmitted by the start of 1999.55 One of the alleged benefits 
of this policy as it applies to beneficiaries is that it encourages low-
                                                                                                                      
strued as an aid to the achievement of its Congressional purposes and objectives. Narrow 
technicalities which proscribe or thwart its policies and purposes are not to be adopted.”); 
Broddie v. Gardner, 258 F. Supp. 753, 756 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (stating that “[c]onsideration 
of Congressional intent is particularly important in construing the Social Security Act so as 
to give full effect to its broad social purposes”); cf. Murray v. Zuke, 408 F.2d 483, 486 (8th 
Cir. 1969) (“Exemption laws are benevolent in nature and must be liberally construed”). 
50 616 F.2d at 831. 
51 Id. 
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)(2000). 
53 See id. 
54 See, e.g., Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The Social Security Act 
is a remedial statute which must be ‘liberally applied’; its intent is inclusion rather than 
exclusion.”); Pleasant v. Richardson, 450 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that the 
Social Security Act should be interpreted “in such a manner that its overriding purpose 
will be achieved, even if the words used leave room for a contrary interpretation”) (quot-
ing Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 1969)); Conklin v. Celebrezze, 319 F.2d 
569, 571 (7th Cir. 1963) (stating that the Social Security Act must be liberally interpreted 
in order to accomplish its moral purpose); Ewing v. Risher, 176 F.2d 641, 644 (10th Cir. 
1949) (stating that a liberal interpretation of the Act should be indulged); Sweeney v. Sec’y 
of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 379 F. Supp. 1098, 1100 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding that liberal 
construction of the Social Security Act means that ambiguities should be construed in 
favor of the plaintiff). 
55 31 U.S.C. § 3332 (2000). Benefit payments are considered as federal payments for 
the purposes of the statute. 31 C.F.R. § 208.2(g)(1)(iii) (2008). 
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income individuals and the elderly to utilize established banks.56 Banks 
and Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) are thought to be safe, simple, 
and accessible for the old-aged and disadvantaged, limiting theft and 
the opportunities for check-cashing stores to take advantage of these 
individuals.57 However, the major impetus behind EFT 99 was the esti-
mated cost-savings to the federal government.58 Sponsors of the bill 
estimated that the move to mandatory direct deposit could save the 
federal government almost $195 million each year.59 Such savings 
would be possible because an electronic transfer costs less than two 
cents to make while government checks can be stolen, forged, or coun-
terfeited.60 Although recipients of federal benefits can still receive their 
checks by mail, the Treasury Department and the federal reserve banks 
have been pushing hard for this transition and developed a marketing 
campaign to encourage payees to opt-in to direct deposit.61
 The Treasury Department also rolled out Electronic Transfer Ac-
counts (ETAs) in partnership with participating banks and other feder-
ally insured financial institutions.62 ETAs are advertised as a low-cost 
and convenient way to receive benefits.63 The marketing efforts of the 
federal government appear to be having their intended effect; in fiscal 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Christine Dugas, Direct Deposit Wins for Safety, Speed, U.S.A. Today, Jan. 25, 1999, 
at B5; Charles A. Jaffe, Banking on Direct Deposit, Boston Globe, Sept. 22, 1997, at A8. 
57 See Dugas, supra note 56; Jaffe, supra note 56. Check cashing stores are used by indi-
viduals who do not have bank accounts, such as poorer immigrants and those with poor 
credit. See Wyatt Buchanan, Bank Accounts Put in Reach of Poor, Immigrants, S.F. Chron., 
Dec. 4, 2007, at A1. These stores are notorious for charging high fees in exchange for cash-
ing checks. See id. Individuals cashing checks worth $100 to $200 can be charged upward of 
$30 to $40. See id. 
58 See Jim Landers, U.S. Backs Off Direct-Deposit Requirement: Benefit Recipients Objected to 
Being Forced into Banks, Dallas Morning News, Dec. 31, 1998, at 1D. 
59 See id. 
60 See Jaffe, supra note 56. Two cents is far less than the cost of cutting a check and of 
using the postal system. Id. Each year, an estimated sixty-five million dollars are lost be-
cause of theft, forgery, and counterfeiting of government checks. Id. 
61 Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Consumer Banking and Payments Law 242 (2005); 
U.S. Treasury, The Facts: Direct Deposit Saves Time, www.eta-find.gov/DirectDepositFacts. 
cfm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). At the end of 1998, the Treasury Department announced 
that it would take a more lenient approach to implementing direct deposit and would not 
require that all payments be made through direct deposit by January 2, 1999. See Landers, 
supra note 58. 
62 Social Security Administration, Electronic Transfer Account, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
deposit/lowcost.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
63 See id. Beneficiaries can remove funds up to four times a month from ETAs and are 
only charged a maximum of three dollars per month. Id. 
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year 2009, 85.7% of social security recipients and 60.8% of SSI recipi-
ents are receiving their monthly benefits payments electronically.64
 As testimony at a Congressional Hearing in June 2008 illustrated, 
however, there were serious oversights made in the implementation of 
EFT 99.65 Current law permits non-bank financial service providers 
(FSPs), such as check cashing companies and payday lenders, to open 
accounts at established banks for social security recipients and to have 
benefits checks directly deposited.66 The social security recipients, how-
ever, do not have control over these funds.67 Once the funds are depos-
ited in the accounts, the bank, less a transaction fee, makes the funds 
available to the non-bank FSP.68 The non-bank FSP then deducts addi-
tional fees before making the funds available to the beneficiary.69 Ac-
cording to testimony of the Inspector General of the SSA, this practice 
is inconsistent with section 207 and other policies that prohibit assign-
ment-like practices.70
II. Debt Collection Procedures 
 Bank customers are subject to involuntary payments when the 
banks “set-off” funds from accounts to cover overdrafts and bank fees.71 
Account garnishment—when a third party obtains a court order direct-
                                                                                                                      
64 Social Security Administration, Trend in Direct Deposit Participation, http://www. 
ssa.gov/deposit/trendenv.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). Here, social security recipients 
include retirees and SSDI recipients. Id. These figures represent a significant increase from 
1985 when only 41.5% of social security beneficiaries and 12.4% of SSI recipients received 
their payments electronically. Id. 
65 See Hearings II, supra note 1 (statement of Patrick O’Carroll, Jr., Inspector Gen., Soc. 
Security Admin.). 
66 See id.; Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Social Insecurity: High-Interest Lenders Tap Eld-
erly, Disabled, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 2008, at A1. SSA proposed new rulemaking to address 
these arrangements in April 2008. Use of Master and Sub Accounts and Other Account 
Arrangements for the Payment of Benefits, 73 Fed Reg. 21,403 (Apr. 21, 2008). 
67 See Hearings II, supra note 1 (statement of O’Carroll). 
68 See id. 
69 See id. According to the Treasury Department, social security recipients pay between 
$6 and $16 in fees for each benefit check cashed by a non-bank FSP. Id. A limited audit of 
five banks known to have relationships with non-bank FSPs, found that as of March 2008, 
over 63,065 individuals receiving SSI had accounts controlled by non-bank FSPs. Id. 
70 See id. He also noted, however, “though some SSA policies appear to prohibit these 
types of arrangements, other policies outline steps to send payments directly to non-bank 
FSPs.” Id. 
71 Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 61, at 116. 
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ing the bank to freeze the funds—is another mechanism through 
which creditors can force involuntary payments from bank accounts.72
A. Garnishment 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that garnishment is allowed to 
enforce post-judgment debts, but not prejudgment garnishment pro-
cedures.73 Even if a creditor obtains a court order before it garnishes a 
bank account, the debtor is still entitled to due process, although some 
courts have held that the notice requirement may be satisfied at the 
same time, or immediately following, the garnishment.74 To satisfy due 
process, the notice that garnishment has occurred must list major fed-
eral exemptions—such as social security and veterans’ benefits—and 
procedures the debtor can use to contest the order.75 However, even 
though notice given to the debtor is required by state law, it is not uni-
form.76 According to counsel for OCC, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, and 
New York have model notices; these list specific exemptions the debtor 
should be aware of and the procedure for requesting a hearing so that 
debtors can assert the affirmative defense their exemption provides.77
 In addition, the Federal Consumer Protection Act protects a por-
tion of an individual’s earnings from garnishment.78 This safeguard is 
                                                                                                                      
 
72 Id. at 113. A debtor’s wages can also be subject to garnishment. U.S. Dep’t of La-
bor, Employment Law Guide: Wage Garnishment (2007), available at http://www.dol. 
gov/compliance/guide/garnish.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). A sheriff or other official 
presents the debtor’s employer with an order that the employer take out a specified 
amount from the debtor’s paycheck each week until the debt is paid off. Id. 
73 See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 337–42 (1969). In Sniadach, the peti-
tioner alleged that a Wisconsin statute giving the creditor ten days from service on the 
garnishee in which to serve summons and complaint on the debtor violated the proce-
dural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 338. Noting the 
enormous leverage that creditors had on wage earners, the court held that notice and 
prior hearing were required prior to an in rem seizure of wages. See id. at 341, 342. 
74 Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 61, at 113. 
75 Id. at 113–14. 
76 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 2–3 (statement of Williams). 
77 See id. at 3. State laws differ on who must provide notice of a debtor’s rights to the 
debtor. See id. In most states, either the court or a creditor must provide notice. Id. In a 
minority of states, the bank that has been served with a court order must notify the debtor 
that their funds have been levied by a creditor. See id. 
78 See Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1677 (2000). Congress 
found that the ability of a creditor to garnish a debtor’s earnings would lead to predatory 
lending that would interfere with interstate commerce by diverting money towards high 
interest rates and related fees. See id. § 1671(a)(1). With some limitations, the Act limits 
the amount of a debtor’s wages that can be garnished to the lesser of twenty-five percent of 
the debtor’s weekly disposable income or thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage. 
See id. § 1673(a)(1), (2); In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 996–97 (2nd Cir. 1973) (noting that 
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lost once earnings are deposited in the consumer’s bank account, al-
though many states’ laws either protect certain exemptions after de-
posit or provide that a minimum amount of money be exempt regard-
less of its origins.79 Most of these state protections must be asserted by 
the debtor as affirmative defenses.80 However, Pennsylvania and Cali-
fornia have taken the initiative to make exceptions to their debt collec-
tions procedures where federally-exempt funds are affected.81 In Penn-
sylvania, when a debtor uses direct deposit to receive their monthly 
benefits, state regulations prevent banks from attaching any exempt 
funds on deposit.82 California takes a different approach and limits that 
a minimum amount in each account into which exempt benefits are 
directly deposited may not be attached.83
 Unlike the examples of California and Pennsylvania, most states 
require the debtor to go to court and demand the release of the ex-
empt property.84 Since indigent debtors generally do not have access to 
legal services or attorneys that are willing to work on small consumer 
debt cases, an account freeze is the equivalent of losing all of the assets 
in their account.85 Additional problems arise when the exempt funds 
are commingled with nonexempt funds, as happened to Mr. Taliaf-
erro.86 However, most courts hold that exempt funds should be pro-
tected if there is commingling—even when deposited into accounts 
with non-exempt funds—so long as the funds are traceable.87
                                                                                                                      
 
Congressional intent was to ensure that debtors could take home enough pay so that they 
could meet basic needs and avoid bankruptcy). 
79 See Usery v. First Nat’l Bank, 586 F.2d 107, 107–08 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that 
banks do not have an affirmative duty to determine a debtor’s right to an exemption and 
to calculate its amount under the Act). The Consumer Credit Protection Act allows states 
to make their own laws more restrictive, reflecting Congressional intent to maximize the 
protection of debtors. 15 U.S.C. § 1677(1). 
80 Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Williams). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 3–4. In California, a debtor must go to court and request an exemption for 
funds in the account in excess of the statutory minimum. See id. at 4. California law speci-
fies the minimum as $2425 for individual accounts and $3650 for joint accounts. Id. at 3–4. 
84 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 61, at 115. 
85 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Saunders) (“The effect of a freezing of 
exempt funds is thus—generally—a full taking of these funds, because rarely does the re-
cipient have the wherewithal to pursue the process of claiming the exemptions.”). 
86 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 2–3 (statement of Taliferro). Commingling of funds oc-
curs when the debtor’s account contains both exempt and nonexempt funds. See id. at 4 
(statement of Saunders). 
87 See id. at 4 (statement of Saunders) However, other courts reason that exempt funds 
lose their special status when they are commingled with nonexempt funds. See Cotton 
States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 308 S.E.2d 199, 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) 
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 There are some banks that look at accounts to determine if the 
funds in them are exempt, a process that is made easier by the fact that 
accounts into which federal benefits are deposited are either marked by 
the computer programs of most financial institutions or clearly have 
funds deposited into them from the Treasury Department.88 Despite 
what appear to be easy measures, the majority of banks ignore any signs 
that there are exempt funds, choosing instead to freeze the account.89 
These banks argue that it is too costly and time consuming to check the 
account.90 This has been further confused and aided by the SSA’s in-
terpretation of garnishment procedures as the agency implies that the 
exemption is merely a defense.91
B. Bank Set-Offs 
 State statutes and common law generally allow banks to set-off cus-
tomer funds without first notifying the customer.92 A “set-off” refers to a 
fee that a bank debits from a customer’s account for debts that the cus-
tomer owes to the bank, such as late-fees and overdrafts.93 Unless a stat-
ute provides otherwise, banks are not required to notify customers of 
this practice either in the documents that the customer signs when 
opening the account or the transaction documents creating the cus-
tomer obligation giving right to the set-off.94
 Some banks even require that the account holder release them of 
any claims that might arise from the bank exercising its right to a set-
off.95 These fees that the bank applies are expensive and dispropor-
                                                                                                                      
 
(holding that unless a bank has notice that funds are exempt when deposited, they “are 
treated as any other general deposit funds, are commingled with other funds on deposit 
with the bank, and are subject to set-off”); Bernardini v. Cent. Nat’l Bank of Richmond, 
290 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Va. 1982) (holding that by commingling exempt and nonexempt 
funds in a general account, depositors lost whatever exemptions they may have kept in the 
account). 
88 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 4–5 (statement of Saunders). 
89 See id. at 4. 
90 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 61, at 116; Hearings, supra note 1, at 4–5 
(statement of Saunders). 
91 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Kelsey). 
92 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 61, at 116. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 See Park View Federal Savings Bank, Deposit Account Agreement, https://www. 
parkviewfederal.com/deposit.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). The Park View Federal Sav-
ings Bank based in Ohio is an example of one bank that has tried to limit its liability in this 
manner. Id. The relevant portion of the Deposit Account Agreement reads: 
2009] Protection of Federally-Exempt Benefits from Garnishment & Bank Set-Offs 337 
tionate to what should be considered equitable. When accounts are 
frozen, banks will normally charge a fee, anywhere from $100 to $150, 
that is taken from the assets in the accounts.96 If an account is frozen, 
checks, electronic transfers for utilities and rent, and ATM debits that 
have been drawn on the account will be returned for insufficient 
funds.97 Each time these are returned, the account is charged any-
where from $25 to $30 as a penalty or Not Sufficient Funds (NSF) fee.98 
In her testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, counsel for the 
NCLS advocated that these fees assessed against beneficiaries be limited 
to the actual cost of the expense incurred.99 The organization argued 
that it was contrary to public policy to ask taxpayers to subsidize recipi-
ents so that they could avoid destitution, only to have banks charge on-
erous fees and profit at taxpayers’ expense.100
C. Changes in Debt Collection Practices Exacerbate the Problem 
 Technology and the proliferation of a market for consumer debt 
have exacerbated garnishment and set-off of exempt funds by making 
the collection process less individualized and subject to a higher rate of 
error.101 Collection agencies purchase debts for pennies on the dollar 
and pursue debtors relentlessly.102 They often misrepresent the size of 
                                                                                                                      
RIGHT OF SET-OFF—Each signer agrees that we may (without prior notice 
and when permitted by law) set off the funds in this account against any due 
and payable debt owed to us now or in the future, by any signers having the 
right of withdrawal, to the extent of such persons’ or legal entities right to 
withdraw. If the debt arises from a note, “any due and payable debt” includes 
the total amount of which we are entitled to demand payment under the 
terms of the note at any time we set off, including any balance the due date 
for which we properly accelerate under the note. This right of set-off does not 
apply to this account if: (a) it is an Individual Retirement Account or other 
tax-deferred retirement account, or (b) the debt is created by a consumer 
credit transaction under a credit card plan, or (c) the debtor’s right of with-
drawal arises only in a representative capacity. The Bank will not be liable for 
the dishonor of any check when the dishonor occurs because we set off a debt 
against this account. The signers agree to hold the Bank harmless from any 
claim arising as a result of the Bank exercising its right of set-off. 
Id. 
96 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 17, at 47. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Saunders). 
100 See id. 
101 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Williams). 
102 See Sewell Chan, An Outcry Rises as Debt Collectors Play Rough, N.Y. Times, July 5, 2006, 
at A1. 
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the debt, contact friends and relatives of the debtor, make threatening 
phone calls, and neglect to investigate claims by the debtor that the 
debt is no longer valid.103
 Many of these agencies inundate small claims courts with collec-
tion actions that have incorrect names or addresses for the debtor.104 
Often debtors will not receive action of the notice against them or will 
not recognize the debt as theirs and will fail to show up in court, result-
ing in default judgments.105 Once a judgment has been obtained, debt 
collectors send out mass e-mails to banks demanding that any funds of 
the debtor be seized in satisfaction of the judgment.106 Demands will be 
sent to financial institutions even if the collection agency does not have 
knowledge that the debtor has an account with that bank, or that the 
funds in the account aren’t exempt under state or federal law.107 Even 
if a debtor can prove that the seized funds are exempt, debt collectors 
can obtain another court order levying against the same account de-
spite not having a reasonable basis for believing that the status of the 
funds in the account has changed.108 According to the FDIC, this “can 
present significant consumer hardships, and [it is] particularly daunt-
ing for elderly and disabled recipients of federal benefits payments.109
III. How Exempt are Exempt Funds?: Judicial Interpretation  
of Section 207 
 The Senate Finance Committee held the “Frozen-Out” hearings in 
response to the increased scrutiny that banks are coming under as 
more and more federal beneficiaries—those who are most at risk for 
                                                                                                                      
103 Id. Judith Guillet’s experience is representative. See id. Guillet, a retired nurse on 
full disability who has never owned a car, received a credit card bill for $2300 that had 
charges from gas stations on it. Id. Even though she was able to convince the bank that the 
charges were false, because the bank turned the debt over to a collection agency, her bank 
account was frozen after the collection agency received a court order. Id. 
104 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Williams). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. In his testimony at the hearing, Mr. Tyler explained how creditors in New York 
can issue information subpoenas with restraining notices on local banks without going to 
court. See id. at 5 (statement of Tyler). Debt collection firms can easily serve every bank in 
the state to locate a debtor’s account. Id. These firms serve banks with CD-ROM disks con-
taining the names and social security numbers of thousands of judgment debtors. Id. 
108 Id. at 5. Because technology has lowered the costs associated with issuing restraints, 
creditors repeatedly try to freeze the account in the hope that the debtor’s circumstances 
have changed (that is, that the debtor has returned to work or commingled his account). 
Id. at 6. 
109 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Williams). 
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being easily taken advantage of—find themselves forced to pay dispro-
portionate penalties from funds that Congress intended to make ex-
empt.110 The tension between the opinions of the Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits discussed below highlight a rift in case law as courts interpret 
social security legislation against a modernized, electronic market-
place.111 The conflicting decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits will 
be persuasive in Miller v. Bank of America, a pending case that, regardless 
of its outcome, promises to spur Congress to legislate and the SSA to 
regulate on the issue. 
A. A Circuit Split on Whether Set-Offs Are “Other Legal Processes” 
 The Tenth Circuit held in Tom v. First American Credit Union that a 
bank’s equitable right of set-off was encompassed by section 207’s “other 
legal processes,” and that the bank violated the Social Security Act when 
it seized the contents of a plaintiff’s account.112 In 1989, the Tom plain-
tiff opened an account with First American Credit Union and signed a 
credit plan agreement.113 The agreement authorized the bank to seize 
the funds in her account without prior notice if she failed to make pay-
ment when due.114 In 1994, the bank notified plaintiff that it was plan-
ning to deduct $2379.20 from her account for past due loan payments 
that the plaintiff and her late husband had accrued.115 Over the plain-
tiff’s objections, the bank seized the $1769 from her account.116
 In its analysis, the court relied on Philpott v. Essex County Welfare 
Board in which the Supreme Court held that a state welfare board could 
not collect a beneficiary’s social security benefits as reimbursement for 
the welfare benefits that it had extended to that resident.117 The Philpott 
                                                                                                                      
110 See id. at 1–2 (statement of Baucus) and 1 (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, S. Fin. 
Comm.) 
111 See Ana I. Torres-Davis & Ryan McNew, Banks Seizing Social Security Bene-
fits: Read the Fine Print on Account Agreement, AARP National Legal Training 
Project 1 (on file with author). 
112 See Tom v. First Am. Credit Union, 151 F.3d 1289, 1291–94 (10th Cir. 1998). 
113 Id. at 1290. 
114 Id. at 1290–91. 
115 Id. at 1291. 
116 Id. These funds consisted entirely of social security and Civil Service Retirement 
funds. Id. 
117 See 409 U.S. 413, 414–17 (1973). At issue in Philpott was a New Jersey law that re-
quired, as a condition of receiving welfare from the state, that potential beneficiaries exe-
cute an agreement promising to pay back the welfare board should the recipient subse-
quently acquire sufficient real or personal property. Id. at 414–15. Wilkes, whose account 
was being held in trust by plaintiff Philpott, was awarded retroactive social security bene-
fits. Id. at 415. The welfare board sued to reach the $1864.20 in retroactive payments. Id. 
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court noted that section 207 imposed a broad bar against the use of any 
legal process to reach social security benefits, and that this bar applied 
to all claimants, even a state.118
 The court in Tom refused to distinguish the legal process at issue in 
Philpott from the bank set-off, stating it could see no reason why Con-
gress would “choose to protect Social Security beneficiaries from credi-
tors who utilized the judicial system, a system that is built upon princi-
ples of fairness and protection of the rights of litigants, yet, on the 
other hand, leave such beneficiaries exposed to creditors who devised 
their own extra-judicial methods of collecting debts.”119 According to 
the court, the agreements signed by the plaintiffs in both cases were 
contracts of adhesion designed to enable creditors to attach social se-
curity payments.120 Construing “other legal processes” to apply only to 
judicial processes, and not set-offs, ran counter to the intent of the So-
cial Security Act.121 Because the Supreme Court refused to carve out an 
exception to section 207 that would enable a state to defray the costs of 
supporting its indigent residents, the court could not reason how the 
private interest of a bank trying to recover on bad-debt was any more 
tolerable.122 The court concluded that set-off fell into the category of 
“other legal processes” for purposes of section 207, and that the bank 
violated federal law when it seized plaintiff’s assets.123
 The first major Ninth Circuit opinion to look at what constituted a 
legal process within the definition of section 207 came in Crawford v. 
Gould.124 The question on appeal was whether section 207 preempted 
the state practice of psychiatric hospitals using social security benefits to 
offset the costs of patient care.125 The plaintiffs in the case were pa-
tients that had been involuntarily committed at state psychiatric hospi-
tals in California.126 At the time, it was state practice for the hospitals to 
maintain hospital trust accounts for patients into which assets prior to 
admission and those acquired after admission were held.127 Soon after 
                                                                                                                      
118 Id. at 417. 
119 See Tom, 151 F.3d at 1292. 
120 Id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. In addition to relying on Philpott in support of this reading, the court also 
cited Bennett v. Arkansas, in which the Supreme Court rejected Arkansas’s argument that 
section 207 should allow the state to recover federal funds from prisoners to help offset 
the cost of imprisonment. See id.; Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1988). 
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000); Tom, 151 F.3d at 1293. 
124 Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1163–68 (9th Cir. 1995). 
125 Id. at 1163. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 1163–64. 
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admission to the hospital, patients were required to sign an “Authoriza-
tion for Deposit and Withdrawal,” that allegedly allowed the hospitals 
to deposit their assets into a fund.128 State and government benefits, 
including social security payments, were then deposited into these ac-
counts while these patients were institutionalized.129 Even if the pa-
tients never gave authorization, California psychiatric hospitals still fol-
lowed the deposit and withdrawal procedures, although they provided 
the non-consenting patients with a “Notice of Informed Withdrawal.”130 
As soon as the patients’ personal assets in the funds exceeded $500, the 
hospitals applied the excess as reimbursement for patient care and 
maintenance.131
 The Crawford court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Brink-
man v. Rahm, in which the court held that the procedures at issue were 
inconsistent with section 207 and were therefore preempted by it.132 In 
Brinkman, patients were involuntarily committed to Washington state 
mental institutions and were liable to the hospitals for the cost of their 
care.133 The Crawford court compared the process in Washington with 
that in California and found that the similarity of the procedures re-
quired the court to conclude that California’s process  also was incon-
sistent with section 207, and therefore preempted by it.134 Although 
California urged the court that “other legal processes” as set forth in 
section 207 should apply only to judicial processes, the court refused 
this interpretation, citing a Second Circuit opinion on a similar set of 
facts.135 In that opinion, the court indicated that section 207 applied 
                                                                                                                      
128 Id. 
129 Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1164. 
130 Id. This “Notice of Informed Withdrawal” informed patients of the amount that the 
hospitals would be withdrawing from their trust accounts. Id. Both this notice and the Au-
thorization for Deposit and Withdrawal advise patients that they have the right to appeal 
the withdrawals from their hospital accounts. Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.; Brickman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263, 265 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit applied 
Bennett to arrive at its holding. See Brickman, 878 F.2d at 265. 
133 See Brickman, 878 F.2d at 264. 
134 Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166. 
135 See id. The Crawford court distinguished the California process from one that was in 
place in New York. See id. In New York, the State Office of Mental Health deducted the cost 
of care from institutionalized mental patients’ accounts, including accounts containing 
social security benefits. See Fetterusso v. New York, 898 F.2d 322, 328 (2nd Cir. 1990). While 
the court in Fetterusso stated it had no basis for concluding that the patients did not volun-
tarily agree to use their social security benefits to pay care and treatment costs, the plain-
tiffs in Crawford did not consent to apply social security benefits to the cost of their care. See 
Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166; Fetterusso, 898 F.2d at 328. 
342 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:323 
not only to formal judicial proceedings, but also to express or implied 
threats or sanctions.136
 However, in 2002, in Lopez v. Washington Mutual Bank the usually 
plaintiff-friendly Ninth Circuit reversed course and issued an opinion 
that eroded the protections it had established in Crawford.137 The 
American Association of Retired Persons criticized the holding in Lopez 
as devastating social security beneficiaries and providing sweeping con-
cessions for the banking industry.138 The issue in Lopez was whether a 
bank could collect on overdrafts and overdraft fees without contraven-
ing the meaning of section 207.139 The plaintiffs received directly de-
posited social security funds into their Washington Mutual accounts.140 
Prior to opening their accounts, plaintiffs executed account agree-
ments.141 These agreements had provisions for overdraft fees that al-
lowed the bank to set-off any overdrafts and penalties against their ac-
counts, and read that notice only be provided after the set-offs were 
made.142 All plaintiffs had overdrawn on their accounts and the bank 
used their social security payments to satisfy their debts.143
 The Lopez court acknowledged that it had broadly construed the 
phrase “other legal processes” in Crawford, but it refused to allow that 
holding to control the “free market banking” arrangement it said was at 
issue.144 According to the court, by voluntarily opening an account, 
signing an agreement that outlined the terms and agreements of the 
bank’s overdraft policies, and then establishing direct deposit for their 
benefits, the plaintiffs consented to the bank using each deposit after 
an overdraft to be treated as a voluntary payment applied against the 
amount due.145 The court distinguished the two cases based on the vol-
untary nature of the relationship in Lopez.146 The plaintiffs could 
choose to remove their assets from the bank’s reach by closing their 
accounts or changing their direct deposit instructions.147 The court 
                                                                                                                      
136 See Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166. 
137 See Lopez v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 302 F.3d 900, 900–08 (9th Cir. 2002). 
138 See Torres-Davis & McNew, supra note 111, at 5. 
139 See Lopez, 302 F.2d at 900. 
140 Id. at 902. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 903. 
144 See Lopez, 302 F.3d at 903–04. 
145 See id. at 904. 
146 See id. The court noted that the plaintiffs in Crawford were involuntarily committed, 
incompetent to handle their personal affairs, and were required by state law to deposit all 
of their liquid assets into funds administered by the hospitals. See id. 
147 See id. 
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determined that it “is sufficient and ‘meaningful’ consent for the re-
cipient to have executed the account agreement which notified him of 
the bank’s standard practice of using deposits to cure overdrafts and 
then to have provided the bank with a deposit to apply in such a fash-
ion.”148
 The Lopez court accepted the bank’s argument that the relation-
ships that beneficiaries maintain with banks are similar to the relation-
ships they maintain with other everyday creditors such as grocers and 
landlords.149 Precluding beneficiaries from using their direct deposits 
to satisfy payments of overdrafts would discourage banks from dealing 
with these individuals and would run contrary to the intent of Congress 
in encouraging electronic payments of benefits.150
 The court in Lopez relied on voluntary consent to legitimize the 
seizing of federally-exempt benefits.151 However, the bank agreements 
did not have provisions explicitly stating that overdrafts and related fees 
would be taken from the plaintiff’s government benefits.152 This logic 
leads to the conclusion that beneficiaries who use direct deposit at fi-
nancial institutions have voluntarily waived their rights under section 
207.153 In essence, they have consented to have their benefits seized 
should the bank maintaining their deposits determine that the individ-
ual owes overdraft fees or NSF fees to the bank. It is unreasonable to 
maintain that Congress intended for the elderly and disabled, some of 
society’s neediest and most susceptible to fraud and usury, to be able to 
waive their rights to statutorily-exempt funds. 
B. Miller v. Bank of America 
 In March 2007, the California Supreme Court granted review in 
Miller v. Bank of America, a case emblematic of the controversy surround-
ing the extent of section 207’s protections.154 Although the case was 
brought in state court and involved mostly state law claims, the ques-
tions of law implicated are fundamentally similar to those in Lopez and 
                                                                                                                      
148 See id. at 905. The court noted that its holding in Lopez would create a tension with 
the Tenth Circuit in Tom and attempted to distinguish the two cases on the facts. See id. at 
906. In Tom, the social security deposits were used to satisfy separate debts unrelated to the 
plaintiff’s deposit account whereas here the court found that the depositor consensually 
arranged for an automatic payment of debts owed to the bank. See id. 
149 See Lopez, 302 F.3d at 905. 
150 See id. 
151 See Torres-Davis & McNew, supra note 111, at 5. 
152 See id. 
153 See Lopez, 302 F.3d at 906. 
154 See Miller v. Bank of Am., 154 P.3d 997, 997 (Cal. 2007) (granting review). 
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Tom.155 The case concerned a class of over one million Bank of America 
customers that maintained checking or savings accounts with the bank 
into which social security or other government benefits were directly 
deposited.156 The facts and supporting testimony given in the case by 
plaintiffs’ experts illustrates the demographics that are most often in-
jured by current banking practices.157 Banks know their customers and 
have tailored account practices so that patrons living paycheck-to-
paycheck or whose livelihood solely consists of government benefits are 
more likely to overdraw their accounts and provide profitable fees for 
the banks.158
1. Background 
 The plaintiff representing the class, Paul Miller, had been a bank 
customer since 1978 and began receiving SSI benefits after a head in-
jury in a physical assault in 1989 left him with a permanent mental dis-
ability.159 In 1994, Mr. Miller agreed to have his monthly benefit checks, 
generally $670.40, electronically deposited into his account after the 
bank’s staff assured him that his funds would be safe, secure, and acces-
sible.160 However, in 1998 the bank erroneously credited his account 
$1799.83 and Mr. Miller, thinking that the money was a retroactive ad-
justment on his monthly payments, spent the funds.161 Without giving 
Mr. Miller prior notice, the bank reversed the credit and because there 
were insufficient funds in his account to repay the bank, the bank 
seized his monthly social security deposit and applied it against the out-
standing balance.162
 During trial, counsel for the plaintiff presented the testimony of 
an expert in social security demographics to illustrate just how neces-
sary federal and state benefits are to recipients’ daily existence.163 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
155 See Miller v. Bank of Am., No. CGC-99–301917, 2004 WL 3153009, at *14–32 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2004). Both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals 
reasoned it necessary to address the Lopez holding as well as the circuit split created by 
Tom. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 223, 231 (Ct. App. 2006); Miller, 2004 WL 
3153009, at *29–30.
156 See Miller, 2004 WL 3153009, at *1. 
157 See id. at *5–6. 
158 See id. at *7–10. 
159 Id. at *2. 
160 See id. 
161 See Miller, 2004 WL 3153009, at *3. 
162 See id. at *4. 
163 Id. at *5–6. In California, approximately one in eight residents receives social secu-
rity benefits, representing a total payout by the government of approximately $3.6 billion 
each month. Id. at *5. Out of the 4.3 million individuals that receive social security benefits 
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expert’s testimony also explained that beneficiaries using direct deposit 
are a significant source of profit for banks.164 Eighty-six percent of 
those receiving social security benefits in California have the funds di-
rectly deposited into their accounts.165 Each month, the bank receives 
$800 million in funds transferred into the 1,079,414 California Bank of 
America accounts into which benefits are directly deposited166 The ex-
pert also testified that over fifty percent of class members had a disabil-
ity and had difficulty understanding quantitative information in 
printed material.167 This suggested to the trial court that most class 
members had difficulty understanding the terms of their account 
agreements and their monthly bank statements.168
 Even though customers who receive direct deposit benefits are 
some of society’s neediest, they are a significant source of profit for the 
bank each month, a reality that the bank has tailored its practices to 
exploit.169 The class members’ checking accounts contribute some $92 
million of profit annually to Bank of America, and every month the 
bank collects $3 to $4 million in penalties from their accounts.170 The 
practice that the bank follows to collect on overdrafts includes a fee for 
each debit to an overdrawn account, not to exceed $160 per day.171 The 
overdrafts and their resultant fees are assessed against any assets that 
are later deposited into the account, regardless of their source.172 The 
bank also processes checks, ATM withdrawals, and other debits from 
largest to smallest so that accounts will be overdrawn more quickly and 
will incur the maximum penalties allowed.173
                                                                                                                      
in California, 1.1 million receive SSI, those benefits that are reserved for the extremely 
low-income elderly, blind, or disabled. Id. 
164 See id. at *5–6. 
165 Id. at *6. Sixty-nine percent of those receiving SSI have those funds directly depos-
ited into their bank accounts. See id. 
166 Miller, 2004 WL 3153009, at *6. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. at*8–10. 
170 See id. at *10–11. Plaintiff’s expert estimated that between August 1994 and Decem-
ber 2003, Bank of America collected $284,385,741 in NSF fees from class members. Id. at 
*11. 
171 Miller, 2004 WL 3153009, at *8. When Bank of America chooses to overdraw an ac-
count, it creates a debit in favor of the bank. See id. The bank will then try to recover the 
funds by seizing any incoming deposits regardless of their source. See id. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. This is because the larger debits are more likely to overdraw an account, 
thereby rendering the smaller debits more likely to trigger additional NSF fees. Id. 
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2. The Court of Appeals Reverses the Superior Court and Finds Benefits 
Are Not Protected 
 The Superior Court held for the plaintiff class, finding that there 
was sufficient evidence to show that Bank of America violated state 
law.174 The court ordered a temporary injunction and allowed a jury 
award of $284,384,741 in restitution and $1000 in damages for each of 
the estimated 1.3 million class members.175 Although this case arose in 
the Ninth Circuit, because it was brought in state court, the Superior 
Court determined that Lopez did not require a finding of federal pre-
emption.176 The judge also noted that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
were at odds on the issue of whether the seizure of electronically depos-
ited federal benefits was in violation of section 207.177 Because the Lopez 
court based its holding on voluntary consent, the Superior Court judge 
made a finding that there was insufficient evidence of an actual agree-
ment between the class members and the bank.178 In none of the 
banks’ marketing materials did it state that it would set-off government 
benefits, nor did it explain that under federal law these benefits are 
exempt from “other legal processes.”179
 On appeal, the California Court of Appeals considered only the 
question of whether a bank acts illegally if it uses electronically depos-
ited benefits to satisfy overdrafts and related debits owed to the bank 
when balancing a checking account.180 The Superior Court relied heav-
ily on the California case, Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, and held that this 
case could be extended to prohibit a bank from clearing overdrafts and 
debiting NSF fees from a deposit account into which government bene-
fits are directly deposited.181 In Kruger, the Supreme Court of California 
found that a bank could not use a customer’s checking account, into 
which only government benefits were deposited, to satisfy mature debts 
owed to that same bank due to the customer’s debt on her credit 
card.182 Although the statutory exemption at issue did not directly ap-
ply to the bank’s right of set-off, the Superior Court in Miller court felt 
                                                                                                                      
174 Id. 
175 Consumer Protection: Court Reaffirms $1 Billion Jury Verdict Against BOA over Social Secu-
rity Funds, BNA, Oct. 18, 2004. Attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs and pre-judgment interest, esti-
mated at $88,313,386, were also awarded. Id. 
176 See Miller, 2004 WL 3153009, at *29. 
177 See id. at *29–30. 
178 See id. at *31. 
179 See id. at *8. 
180 See Miller, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 225. 
181 See id. at 229. 
182 See Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 449–53 (Cal. 1974). 
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that public policy required it to extend the right of exemption to the 
set-off at issue.183
 The Court of Appeals, however, found that the bank set-off in 
Miller was not sufficiently like that in Kruger because the account being 
debited was the same on which the debt was incurred.184 The practice 
used by Bank of America, although it implicated the legislative prefer-
ences at issue in Kruger, did not “present the same risk of circumventing 
the exemptions of public benefit funds from attachment and execu-
tion” as were at issue in Kruger.185 The court relied on Lopez to illustrate 
that a bank could use customer funds regardless of their source for in-
ternal balancing of the account.186 An analysis of legislative history in 
California showed that legislation was passed one year after Kruger to 
impose notice requirements and other conditions on a bank’s right to 
set-off independent debts.187 The court reasoned that the different 
treatment for overdrafts and bank charges indicated the “Legislature’s 
view that internal account balancing is different from the practice of 
setting-off separate debt against a deposit account, does not implicate 
the same considerations, and does not warrant the same legal treat-
ment.”188 The court refused to extend Kruger, stating that the task of 
regulating the banking industry in which so many stakeholders and 
their practices were implicated was for the legislature, not the court.189
                                                                                                                      
183 See Miller, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 229–30. 
184 See id. at 230–32. 
185 See id. at 230–31. The court acknowledged that the practice used by Bank of Amer-
ica imposed a hardship on low-income clients, but that the propriety and legality of the 
practice were not issues raised on appeal. See id. 
186 See id. at 231–32. The court highlighted the reasoning that distinguished Lopez from 
Tom on the basis that the “loan obligation [in Tom] was ‘a separate, pre-existing debt unre-
lated to the operation of the depositor’s checking account,’ and there was no indication the deposi-
tor had ever consented to pay that debt from his independent checking account.” Id. The 
court found this distinction consistent with “the accepted meaning of set-off, which has 
traditionally been defined to mean a counterdemand ‘growing out of an independent transac-
tion.’” See id. at 231–32 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1404 (8th ed. 2004)). 
187 See id. at 232. “Section 864 of the [California] Financial Code requires a bank to 
give an account holder notice when it exercises any setoff for a debt, and an opportunity 
for the account holder to claim an exemption if the debt is not owing or the funds are 
exempt.” Id. However, if a bank obtains the customer’s advanced written consent, it does 
not have to adhere to these restrictions. See id.
188 See Miller, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 232–33. 
189 See id. at 233. Several U.S. agencies and interest groups representing the banking 
industry weighed in on behalf of the defendant with amici curiae briefs. The Supreme 
Court of California heard oral argument for this case on April 7, 2009. 
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III. Clarifying the Prohibitions of Section 207 
 There are several solutions that agencies, stakeholders, and poli-
cymakers have proposed that can help untangle what is an imbroglio of 
state and federal law, agency inaction, and business interests.190 These 
solutions must be combined in a cohesive regulatory effort to ensure 
that the purposes of the Social Security Act and section 207 are real-
ized, uniform regulations are implemented, and that federal benefits 
will not be threatened by creditors. 
A. Congress Must Have Intended for Section 207 to Apply to  
Garnishment and Bank Set-offs 
 The SSA and other federal regulatory agencies must recognize 
that they have an affirmative duty to ensure that banks and other credi-
tors cease satisfying debts with federally-exempt funds.191 Although the 
legislative history of section 207 is bare, one can infer from the reme-
dial nature of the Social Security Act that its exemptions should be lib-
erally construed and should be interpreted to affect garnishment pro-
cedures and bank set-offs.192 During the Senate Finance Committee 
hearings in 2007, Senator Baucus did not hesitate in expressing his 
opinion that section 207 trumps state law in order to protect federal 
benefits.193 The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution is explicit: 
where there is a conflict between state and federal law, federal law pre-
vails.194
 Under the analysis for conflicts preemption, preemption will be 
found if compliance with both state and federal law prove impossi-
ble.195 If state laws permit banks and other creditors to attach and set-
                                                                                                                      
 
190 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 9–11 (statement of Kelsey), 7–9 (statement of Saun-
ders) and 10–12 (statement of Williams). 
191 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)–(b) (2000). At the hearing, Senator Baucus expressed his 
frustration with federal banking regulators and the draft guidance they had issued prior to 
the hearing. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Baucus). 
192 See Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., Fla. v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828, 831 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Schroeder v. Hobby, 222 F.2d 713, 715 (10th Cir. 1955); Mayers v. N.Y. Commu-
nity Bankcorp, Inc. No. CV-03–5837, 2005 WL 2105810, at *15–17 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) 
(refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that New York state statute is preempted by section 
207). 
193 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Baucus) (“Even if a state court wants a 
bank to freeze Social Security or other protected funds, the bank should not do so, be-
cause Federal law bans such garnishment.”). 
194 See U.S. Const. art VI, § 2. 
195 See id.; see, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1984) (“[S]tate law is pre-
empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found 
pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
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off the funds that Congress has specifically marked as exempt, a credi-
tor’s action and the court’s compliance with that creditor is inconsis-
tent with the intent of section 207.196 Congress added section 207 to 
provide a minimum level of protection for beneficiaries.197 Thus, sec-
tion 207 sets a baseline; states can only legislate in this area if they are 
willing to provide more protection.198 This encourages states to ex-
periment with different ways of protecting a beneficiary’s exempt as-
sets.199 As mentioned, California and Pennsylvania have already taken 
the lead in fashioning specific protections that ensure some level of 
relief will be available to their citizens.200
                                                                                                                      
requirements.”); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Cal. Dep’t of Agric., 373 U.S. 132, 142 
(1963) (“The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state 
regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing 
the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different 
objectives.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (stating that the court’s primary 
role in this case is to determine if state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”). The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly set forth the circumstances that give rise to federal preemption of state law. See 
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’r v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368–69 (1986); English, 496 U.S. at 79; Fla. 
Lime, 373 U.S. at 142. If Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law in the enact-
ing statute, then the court will find that state law is preempted. See Jones v. Rath Packing 
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–26 (1977). However, preemption can be found even where Con-
gress has not made its intent explicit. See English, 496 U.S. at 79. Implied preemption can 
be found where there is a direct conflict between the state and federal law, when compli-
ance with both laws are impossible, or when state law stands in the way of accomplishment 
of the objectives of Congress. See English, 496 U.S. at 78–79; Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142. Pre-
emption is also found where Congress has chosen to legislate an entire field of regulation, 
leaving no room for the states to supplant federal law. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230–33, 238 (1947). 
196 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a); Hearings, supra note 1, at 1–2 (statement of Baucus). The 
courts and the SSA have carved out specific funds to which the general prohibition against 
garnishment, attachment and levy do not apply. See 42 U.S.C. § 407(b), (c); id. § 659. The 
Secretary of the Treasury can make levies for the collection of delinquent federal taxes 
and, under certain circumstances, garnishment or similar legal process brought by an 
individual to enforce a child support or alimony obligation can force delinquent child 
support payments to be made out of monthly benefits payments. See Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331, 6305; 42 U.S.C. § 659. 
197 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a); Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. 177–78 (1963) (finding states can set 
stricter standards where federal regulation is only meant to provide the minimum regula-
tion necessary). 
198 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a); Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142 (1963); Hearings, supra note 1, at 1–
2 (statement of Baucus). 
199 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that, with the consent of its citizens, states can act as laboratories of democ-
racy, and test new ideas implementing innovative policies); Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 
(statement of Williams). 
200 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Williams). 
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 The FDIC expressed a preference at Senate Finance Committee 
hearings that language be inserted into section 207 making preemp-
tion explicit before they take action and regulate.201 The FDIC recom-
mended that Congress amend section 207 and clarify the specific pro-
tections that are provided by adding language that the section is 
intended as an absolute bar against attachment, levy, or other legal 
processes.202 The FDIC has also suggested that Congress require spe-
cific accounting practices for accounts into which federally-exempt 
funds are directly deposited on a regular basis and that it cap the fees 
banks charge beneficiaries in the legislation itself.203
 Certainly Congress could make its intent more explicit in the legis-
lation, but this should not be a prerequisite to action by the federal 
agencies.204 This cautious approach ignores the realities of legislative 
inaction and the need for those agencies with the most information 
and expertise—the SSA and the federal banking regulators—to provide 
necessary guidance.205 Asking Congress to go through the political 
process necessary to amend section 207 would be politically arduous 
and could limit the scope of section 207 if additional language narrow-
ing the exemption was inserted into the bill in order to reach political 
compromise.206 The specific changes originally advocated by the FDIC 
are not the material of legislative amendments, but are best left to the 
                                                                                                                      
201 See id. at 10 (statement of Kelsey). The FDIC now favors rulemaking by the SSA and 
the Treasury Department as the best solution. Hearings II, supra note 1 (statement of Steve 
Fritts, Assoc. Dir., Risk Mgmt. Policy and Examination Support Branch, Div. of Supervision 
and Consumer Prot., Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp.). 
202 Hearings, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Kelsey). 
203 See id. 
204 See id. Language narrowing the scope of the provision is best provided by the agen-
cies charged with implementation and oversight of the legislation. See Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
205 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292 (2002) (agency decision-making is 
product of expertise, uniformity, and wide-spread consultation); United States v. Craft, 535 
U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (Legislative “inaction lacks persuasive significance because several 
equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that 
the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change”) (quoting Cent. Bank of 
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)); cf. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’r v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986) (“An agency’s expertise 
is superior to that of a court when a dispute centers on whether a particular regulation is 
‘reasonably necessary to effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the pur-
poses’ of the Act the agency is charged with enforcing; the agency’s position, in such cir-
cumstances, is therefore due substantial deference.”). 
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)(2000). 
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agencies that are responsible for the day-to-day oversight of the federal 
exemption.207
B. The Social Security Administration Must Clarify Congressional Intent 
Through Regulation 
 As the agency responsible for oversight of the Social Security Act, 
the SSA has the statutory authority and expertise to promulgate rules 
that clarify the rights of beneficiaries and the intent of Congress.208 The 
SSA is responsible for the implementation, oversight, and enforcement 
of its regulations promulgated under the Act and must effectively issue 
guidance for banks, creditors, and courts to follow.209 At a minimum, 
the SSA must revise the current regulations that imply that section 207 
is to be raised as an affirmative defense.210 Raising the federal exemp-
tion as an affirmative defense harms beneficiaries and necessitates the 
need for social resources and legal advice that is not always readily 
available to indigent clients.211 Section 207 was clearly intended to bar 
action by banks and creditors in the first instance, without forcing 
beneficiaries to rely on it as an affirmative defense.212
C. Federal Banking Agencies Must Take Action 
 Federal banking agencies must act to promulgate regulations that 
protect federally-exempt funds from garnishment and set-off.213 When 
                                                                                                                      
 
207 Hearings II, supra note 1 (statement of Fritts); see Hearings, supra note 1, at 7–8 
(statement of Saunders). 
208 42 U.S.C. § 405(a); see Hearings, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Williams). The So-
cial Security Act authorizes the promulgation of rules necessary to carry-out its mission. 42 
U.S.C. § 405(a). The Commissioner of Social Security can establish procedures and rules, 
consistent with the Social Security Act, that are necessary or appropriate to carry out its 
provisions. See id.; John Bordeau et al., Social Security and Public Welfare, Corpus 
Juris Secundum § 76 (2008). 
209 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Williams). 
210 See id. at 4 (statement of Kelsey ) and 6–7 (statement of Williams). 
211 See Dennis W. Archer, Op-Ed., Legal System That Aids Society’s Poor in Need Itself, San 
Antonio Express-News, Jan. 31, 2004, at 11B (discussing how politicians fail to provide 
adequate resources for legal services); Henry Weinstein, Legal Aid to the Poor Falls Short, 
L.A. Times, Nov. 21, 2002, at A1 (discussing how the number of lawyers providing services 
for the poor is declining as need for them grows). Studies have shown that seventy to 
eighty percent of the legal needs of the indigent are not met. See Archer, supra. 
212 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). According to the FDIC, this formal rulemaking by the SSA 
would give banks the legal authority necessary to interpret the guidelines. Hearings, supra 
note 1, at 11 (statement of Williams). 
213 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 7–9 (statement of Saunders). The agencies that must 
cooperate to ensure that uniform guidelines are issued include the FDIC, OCC, Treasury 
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federal agencies act within the scope of their congressionally delegated 
authority, state law is effectively preempted to the extent that it is in-
compatible with federal regulations.214 When analyzing the preemptive 
effect of federal agency action, a narrow focus on intent is inappropri-
ate.215 Federal agencies have considerable latitude to promulgate rules 
so long as their actions are not arbitrary or capricious.216
 To the extent that there is any uncertainty among financial institu-
tions and courts surrounding the scope of section 207, the banking 
agencies must offer guidance prohibiting the attachment or set-off of 
federally-exempt benefits.217 As counsel for NCLS explained during the 
2007 Senate Finance Committee hearings, the federal banking agencies 
already provide guidance preempting and interpreting state law for 
their regulated institutions.218 The OCC and the OTS have issued di-
rectives preempting state laws in the areas of predatory mortgage lend-
ing, electronic deposits, and foreclosures.219 In fact, according to testi-
mony at the hearing, the five agencies responsible for banking 
regulations recently offered guidance on predatory mortgage lending 
that was not grounded in any particular federal law, but was considered 
by these agencies as a necessary means of protecting consumers.220
                                                                                                                      
Department, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the National Credit 
Union Administration. 
214 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 694–709 (1984) (finding appli-
cation of a state’s advertising ban preempted by Federal Communications Commission 
regulations); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) (stat-
ing that courts will not disturb an agency’s regulations if the “choice represents a reason-
able accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by 
the statute”). In fact, even agency orders and letters have been found to preempt state law 
in narrow circumstances. See Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 154. 
215 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Saunders) 
216 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. If a federal statute is silent or ambiguous, the court 
must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is based upon a permissible construc-
tion of the statute. See id. at 843. Where “Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to 
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provi-
sion of the statute by regulation.” Id. at 843–44. These agency regulations are given “con-
trolling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 
Id. at 844. If the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit, a 
court “may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable 
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” Id. 
217 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Saunders). The FDIC has stated that 
the SSA and Treasury Department, “as the agencies responsible for implementation and 
interpretation of these benefits program, . . . are in the best position to address the gar-
nishment exemption issue.” See Hearings II, supra note 1 (statement of Fritts). 
218 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Saunders). 
219 See id. 
220 Id. 
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 At the hearing, the FDIC and OCC indicated their willingness to 
work together with Congress and the other federal banking regulators 
to explore possible solutions to the problem.221 In November 2007, the 
five agencies overseeing banking regulations requested public com-
ment on best practices for handling garnishment orders and set-offs 
where federally-exempt funds are affected.222 At a later hearing in June 
2008, the Treasury Department expressed its willingness to lead a joint 
inter-agency effort to find a regulatory solution to the problem.223 
While it appears that these agencies are taking a first step, they must 
actively consider creative ways to ensure that beneficiaries are no longer 
the victim of creditors.224 The ultimate regulation must require that 
one of three alternatives be implemented. The agencies could mandate 
that federally-exempt funds be deposited into a separate account that 
only holds exempt funds.225 These could be offered at no cost to the 
account holder so long as he or she maintains an additional checking 
account with that financial institution.226 These accounts could easily 
be flagged as only containing exempt funds so that, upon the receipt of 
court orders, bank employees would know that these funds could not 
be attached or set-off.227 An alternative would be to set a minimum 
amount in the customer’s account that could not be set-off or gar-
nished while the customer’s legal rights were being resolved, as in Cali-
fornia.228 Finally, the banking regulators could require that all banks 
                                                                                                                      
 
221 See id. at 12 (statement of Kelsey) and 8–9 (statement of Williams). In 2007, the 
FDIC formed an interagency working group that issued proposed guidance for banks to 
use when faced with garnishment orders. See Hearings II, supra note 1 (statement of Fritts). 
222 Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (proposed 
Sept. 28, 2007). 
223 See Hearings II, supra note 1 (statement of Gary Grippo, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for 
Fiscal Operations, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury). Mr. Grippo, said that the interagency solu-
tion could include “provid[ing] guidance to financial institutions that follow the guidance 
and allow recipients access to funds.” Id. 
224 At the June 2008 hearing, Mr. Grippo expressed that any solution must ensure that 
recipients of federal benefits have access to at least some of their funds while the garnish-
ment order is being adjudicated and the value of exempt and non-exempt funds are de-
termined. See Hearings II, supra note 1 (statement of Grippo). Mr. Grippo explained that 
“[t]he model used to establish the appropriate amount of funds excluded from an account 
freeze would need to be developed based on an analysis of benefit payment amounts and 
the ability of financial institutions to implement it without complex accounting or re-
search.” Id. 
225 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Kelsey). 
226 See id  at 10 (statement of Kelsey) and 5 (statement of Saunders). 
227 See id. at 5 (statement of Saunders). 
228 See id. at 10 (statement of Kelsey) and 6 (statement of Saunders). According to tes-
timony at the April 2008 hearing, a compromise regulation is forthcoming that proposes a 
similar solution. See Hearings II, supra note 1, at 14–15 (statement of Margot Saunders, 
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accepting direct deposits of federally-exempt funds apply a simple “First 
In Last Out” accounting system.229 In this system, exempt funds would 
be considered to be both the first deposited and the last withdrawn on 
any given day.230
 The banking regulators must also cap overdraft and NSF fees that 
banks charge so that they reflect the actual costs of doing business.231 
The fees that the banks assess against frozen accounts are not based on 
the actual costs to the bank of doing business and result in a windfall to 
the banking industry.232 Otherwise, banks are effectively making money 
off of the taxpayers that provide a portion of their earnings to help 
needy individuals like Mr. Taliaferro avoid destitution.233
Conclusion 
 Millions of Americans rely on direct deposit for receipt of their 
monthly federal benefits. Many of these individuals will find themselves 
the victim of a bank set-off or attachment at some point. Each day, indi-
viduals like Mr. Taliaferro and Mr. Miller are forced to fight creditors 
with far greater resources. Congress never intended for these individu-
als to be deprived of the subsistence funds that our country has prom-
                                                                                                                      
Counsel, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.). This regulation would ensure that once receiving an 
order to freeze an acount, a bank would: 
 1. Review the electronic deposits made into the account in the previous 30 
to 45 days (called the “look-back period”), to determine whether any are ac-
companied with the electronic designation for federally exempt funds.
 2. If there are any exempt funds deposited into the account, then the total 
amount of exempt funds deposited within the look-back period will be multi-
plied by a factor . . . .
 3. The multiplied sum of exempt funds will be considered the protected 
amount—this amount of money will always be kept safe from freezing or at-
tachment or garnishment, regardless of the flow of money into and out of the 
account.
 4. Funds in the account which are in excess of the multiplied sum will be 
frozen and held pursuant to state law for disposition.
 5. The recipient will be free to seek to protect all exempt funds over the 
protected amount using the standard state court procedure.
 6. No garnishment fees assessed by the bank can be taken from the pro-
tected amount.
Id. at 15. 
229 See id. at 5 (statement of Saunders). 
230 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Saunders). 
231 See id. at 7. 
232 See id; Miller, 2004 WL 3153009, at *6–11. 
233 See Miller, 2004 WL 3153009, at *6–11; Hearings, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of 
Saunders). 
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ised them, and it certainly could not have foreseen the opprobrious 
debt collection practices and inequitable fees of creditors and banks 
when it enacted section 207. As the testimonies at the 2007 Senate Fi-
nance Committee hearings and the Miller decision make certain, the 
magnitude of the problem requires that the federal government take 
immediate action to ensure that those most in need of protection have 
access to their federal benefits in order to honor  the purpose of sec-
tion 207.234
                                                                                                                      
234 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 1–2 (statement of Baucus), and 7–9 (statement of 
Saunders). 
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